Britain now generates more and better information about political finance than almost any other country. Nonetheless, the data created by the Political Parties Elections and Referendums Act has not inspired a new wave of analysis. Strangely, previous quantitative studies relate to the earlier period when figures were much more difficult to obtain (Bond 2007; Fisher 1992; Fisher 2000; Mitchell and Bretting 1993) .
Writing on the subject tends to emphasise aggregate figures, critique of the legal and administrative system, and the recapitulation of media controversies. In doing so, the literature assumes a party-centred approach. This style of research has shown its worth, but, clearly, political fundraising involves donors as well as donees. This article exploits the potential of UK official data to shed light on the motivations of business donors (Scarrow 2006) . Business money is the most controversial source of political finance. Indeed, business financing of political parties always generates a tensions between votes (the currency of democracy) and pounds (the currency of capitalism) (Lindblom 1977: 189-200; Vogel 1996) .
The political context since official disclosure began in 2001 provides several opportunities. This was the era of New Labour. Tony Blair went as far as asserting that Labour was the "natural party of business" (Coen and Grant 2006: 17) . Was business sufficiently convinced to begin offering financial support to the Labour party? Labour's triumph was the Conservatives' rout and the pre-Cameron period represents the darkest era in the history of the post-war Conservative party (Bale 2009: 224) . By contrast, in recent years, Labour, under both Blair and Brown, had become a tired party that seemed to have spent too long in government. In other words, the popularity of the parties, and their prospects of controlling government, varied hugely in this period. This enables us to separate business sympathy towards the Conservative party from business recognition that the Conservatives have tended to win British elections. As well as these political conditions, the legislation itself is likely to have affected behaviour (Scarrow 2007: 202) . Disclosure may well have reduced business donations, as firms receive unwelcome publicity and complaints from shareholders. Indeed, disclosure and politics probably interact. When a reforming Australian Labor Party (ALP) introduced disclosure in the 1980s, it began writing to conservative donor businesses asking that they also contribute to the ALP (Gordon and Ceresa: 1995) . New Labour was perhaps more subtle, but businesses may have decided that donations to Labour were a cheap insurance against political risks from one of the world's most powerful executives. This article links such questions in a comparative framework. I look at the contribution rate and whether donations have been pragmatically or ideologically motivated. Previous research on Australia, Canada, Germany and the United States suggests that contribution rates are much higher in liberal market economies. Also, if such economies are combined with an ideologically-structured party system, business financing of parties should display both ideological and pragmatic motivations.
The article is organised straightforwardly. In the next section, I introduce the key concepts of pragmatism and ideology in political finance. I then present hypotheses to explain cross-national variation. Then after a discussion of the regulatory, economic and political context of the British case, I move on to the empirical core of the paper, which analyses in turn three new databases on business behaviour in British political finance.
Motivations for Business Financing of Political Parties
Business contributions to political parties can be conceived in terms of two general motivations: ideological and pragmatic. Ideological contributions are not likely to survive a cost-benefit analysis because, whatever the possible benefits, it is rational to free ride on the contributions of other businesses to the long-term class-wide interest (Olson 1971) . Ideological contributions are made to the political actors most likely to promote capitalism in general, regardless of whether any specific benefits will accrue to the contributing firm. The distribution of ideologically motivated donations should be relatively stable over time. Party ideologies change slowly. Even if parties tack to the left or the right for tactical reasons, it is rare for the left-right ranking of parties to change. By contrast, pragmatic contributions are essentially business decisions, taken with the firm's usual profit-seeking motive. The distribution of pragmatic donations should follow short-term changes in the power and popularity of parties. These two motivations may interact in a single decision about the distribution of political contributions. For example, take a firm that has an ideological preference for the right. Under a left-wing government it may be prepared to contribute to the left, while also continuing to express its ideological preference by funding the right-wing opposition. Thus, a firm's distribution of cash to parties is a strategic decision taking into account political power and the firm's ideological position, if it has one.
Social factors also play an important part in business financing of political parties (Bond 2004) . However, this can be seen as a mechanism of ideologically or pragmatically-motivated giving. In many countries, pragmatic donations to parties occur in the context of low corruption. In this situation, discrete exchanges such as the purchase of policy or even the purchase of access to decision-makers, incurs too high a reputational cost on politicians and businesses. Instead, donations form part of a reciprocal exchange. They help to develop and maintain a relationship with politicians, which may, in due course, produce a small but real increase in the probability of successful lobbying (Clawson, Neustadtl and Weller 1998; Gordon 2005; McMenamin 2012) . Networks are also important in understanding ideological donations, but in this case the network precedes the donation. Many people are socialised into an ideological position and even socialised into a close relationship with a particular party. Indeed, the relationship between "public schools", high finance in the City of London and the Conservative Party is a classic example of this process.
Businesses and businesspeople are likely to be differently-motivated in making financial contributions to political parties (McMenamin 2009: 212-213) . Individuals are more likely to make ideological contributions. In contrast to firms, they do not have to justify their decision to shareholders. Individuals can use cash generated by business activities to further their political values as opposed to their business interests. Of course, rich individuals are also interested in getting richer and may also be motivated pragmatically. Individuals are particularly likely to be influenced by social position. It is they who actually went to certain schools, frequent certain clubs and sit on certain boards.
The incentives facing firms push them towards pragmatic motivations. Most firms are explicitly dedicated to making a profit. Therefore, a well-run firm should not be tempted to make ideological gestures, even if such gestures are consistent with the social positions of the firm's management and owners. Publicity imposes a reputational cost on a firm and a politician (Grant 1993 144) . Therefore, firms may be tempted to route donations through individuals associated with the firm. In aggregate, firms and individuals should behave differently, but, in many instances, their motivations may overlap (Bond 2007: 59-60) .
Truly massive businesses find themselves in a different political situation to other firms (Coen 1997, 99; Grant 1993: 87-88 In public companies, political donations can lead to unwelcome controversy within the firm's own governance structures. Donations will probably be more visible to politicians than to the general public and the firm's shareholders. Ideological donations may attract the enmity of one side of politics, while perceived pragmatism may attract requests for money, and perhaps even potentially damaging offers of benefits, from all political parties.
Large businesses, by virtue of their importance to the economy, possess massive structural power. In contrast to smaller businesses, they do not necessarily need to buy the attention of politicians to their particular needs. However, financial contributions may serve to increase their influence yet further. Visibility imposes a potential cost on businesses, but that visibility is much more costly to politicians. In a democracy, politicians need to emphasise that the currency of votes trumps that of money. Thus, visibility places a very significant constraint on benefits that politicians may be willing to award to donor businesses. Nonetheless, the profits that can be gained from even subtle changes in public policy are so massive that there are always potential benefits to firms from engagement with the political system.
In the empirical sections of this article, I assess the evidence for ideologically and pragmatically-motivated donations amongst businesses in general, very large businesses and prominent individuals associated with large businesses.
Explaining cross-national variation
In liberal market economies, the highly competitive, short-term focus of firms should generate substantial demand for private goods that could help firms develop an advantage over their rivals. Pragmatism should be an important motivation for business financing of parties and since pragmatism is embedded in the basic profitseeking mission of the firm the contribution rate should be high. The preference for less state intervention, and the awareness of the state's power to disrupt the business environment, is likely to engender a widespread awareness of the importance of public policy goods to the overall business sector. This should result in a relatively important ideological motivation in business contributions to parties. However, this political effect should interact with the party system. In a polarised political system, the political risk should be greater. If there is a little difference between parties' economic policies and reputations, the ideological motivation is likely to be marginal. In a co-ordinated market economy, the most important policies for firms tend to be the public goods defined, championed, and, to a substantial extent, actually delivered by their business associations. In this context, the pragmatic motivation for contributions to political parties is likely to be very weak. The combination of consensual political institutions and constrained parties means there is a very low risk of major policy change from election to election (Iversen 2005: 122-182; Wood 2001) . So, there is also likely to be low interest in ideological financing of political parties. Since both motivations are undermined by the political economy, the contribution rate should be very low. Germany, the archetypical co-ordinated market economy, exemplifies this pattern of business financing of parties (McMenamin 2012 ).
The British case
The regulation of British political finance has a long history. The first law on political finance dates back to 1883 when the Corrupt and Illegal Practices (Prevention) Act introduced a cap on spending at constituency level (Fisher 2009: 305) . Although an intervention in private spending, this law expressed a reluctance to acknowledge the importance of parties, which was to endure through the twentieth century. The The data analysed in this section are available at http://www.dcu.ie/~mcmenami. As Figure 1 shows, the Conservatives received one quarter of their income from companies, but Labour well under five per cent. The Conservative party, because it was in opposition, received considerable public funding (Ewing 2005: 184-185) . If the Conservative party had not had either public funding or substantial company funding, it would have had a similar income to Labour. If it had had neither, it would have had to do with a much smaller income than the Labour. Therefore, although it cannot be said that companies are the paymasters of the Conservative party, there seems to be some potential for them to influence the Conservatives. By contrast, business donations are barely noticeable to the Labour party.
[ Figure 1 about here]
In the period since 2001, as Figure 2 illustrates, Conservative income from private donations has risen fairly gradually, excepting predictable spikes in advance of elections (Fisher 2000: 198) . During this time, the popularity of the party has also increased, raising the possibility of a relationship between the two. However, a regression analysis controlling for the number of days to the next election, suggests no significant relationship between Conservative donations and the average quarterly poll value from ICM (Please see Table 1 ). [ Figure 2 about here]
[ Figure 3 about here]
[ Table 1 about here]
[ Figure 4 about here]
[ Figure 5 about here]
[ Table 2 about here] Of course, such a pattern also reflects the fact that parties fundraise more aggressively as elections approach. Nonetheless, pragmatic businesses should be able to resist their approaches. Secondly, Labour's most successful quarter for company donations was just before an unpopular government was ejected from power in 2010. Again, the most obvious interpretation is that these companies had an ideological preference for Labour.
By contrast, the two types of donors seem to behave differently in contributing to the 
Big Business
As already argued, there are many good reasons to suspect that very big businesses should behave differently to other companies. Moreover, the study of large businesses provides methodological opportunities not available when researching the wider business sector. In particular, the greater amount of available information and smaller number of businesses makes it easier to analyse firms at the individual level.
It is also practical to study non-contributors as well as contributors, thereby avoiding the sample selection bias that affects so much of social science.
I drew down a sample of the 1005 largest UK-registered enterprises in the FAME database as of July 2009. This includes public and private companies as well as some partnerships. This dataset is available at http://www.dcu.ie/~mcmenami.
[ Multivariate analysis can help us begin to understand the motivation behind these payments, by examining the timing of payments in relation to the electoral timetable and popularity of the parties, while controlling for the basic characteristics of the firms themselves. Table 4 Labour) when an election is distant and start to contribute to the opposition (i.e. the Conservatives) as the election approaches. Turnover and sectoral data came from the FAME database. However, some turnover figures had to be inter-or extrapolated and a very small number of companies were assigned sectoral codes by the author. The turnover figures have been logged to reduce the impact of outliers. Larger firms, with their greater financial resources, should be more likely to contribute. Sectors were coded according to the nine basic categories to the UK SIC 2003 classification, with sector one (fuel extraction, energy production and distribution, water supply) acting as the base category. The type of business in which a firm is engaged should affect its contribution strategy, although it is difficult to find a straightforward theory to map different sectors on to the two parties.
[ Table 4 about here]
The results suggest that larger firms may be more likely to contribute to the Labour party but not to the Conservatives. and senior staff than through direct payments from the business itself. However, these individuals made slightly fewer payments than did their businesses.
[ Table 5 about here] contribute to the opposition without regard to its popularity and pay no, or very little, heed to the electoral timetable it seems likely their motivation is ideological. This is consistent with the American literature, which tends to show that individual donations are much more ideological than corporate donations (Burris 2001) . Thus, it seems that individual donations are just that. They are not indirect donations by big businesses. Although both are controversial, pragmatic donations are considered much more illegitimate than ideological donations. Therefore, if businesses were to donate through individuals, in order to reduce visibility, we would expect that such donations would be more, not less pragmatic, than direct corporate donations.
Conclusions and discussion
The highly transparent and permissive nature of the current British system of political finance regulation provides an excellent opportunity for studying business financing Nonetheless, in Britain, as elsewhere, it is usually assumed that smaller businesses have a stronger commitment to right-wing politics. Finally, there might be a regulatory explanation. Publicity and reputation are much more substantial costs for the largest businesses and payments by individual companies are now very easy to research. Moreover, a number of controversies in the Labour era may have raised awareness of the costs of any political activity by big business (Hencke 2007; Wintour 2008; Booth 2009; Woolf, Milland and Watts, 2010) . Under this scenario, the withdrawal of big business from political finance is likely to be relatively permanent. The last difference between Britain and other liberal countries is the nature of the exchange between pragmatic contributors and parties. In contemporary Australia (McMenamin 2008: 378-9 ) and the United States (Clawson, Neustadtl and Weller 1998: 63-138) , and in the past in Canada ( for students of British and comparative politics to probe these questions using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Figure A1 demonstrates that the Conservatives have been more dependent on loans than Labour. This is hardly surprising given that they have been in opposition for all of the relevant period and have been an unpopular opposition for most of that time.
Appendix: Loans and British Political Finance
While the commercial basis for loans from banks is obvious, the motivation for the loans by other companies and by individuals is more mysterious. The sources of the loans are very different for the two parties. Labour received several seven-figure loans from individuals. These are the loans that were the subject of the "loans-forpeerages" controversy, which led to the police questioning prime minister Tony Blair as a witness. Labour borrowed virtually all remaining money from retail banks. By contrast, the Conservatives' largest borrowings were from financial institutions, with substantial loans from both retail banks and more specialised private banks and other financial services firms. Officially, the Tories also borrowed almost seven million from other businesses. However, most of this seems to have been a (legal) way of trying to preserve the anonymity of large donations by wealthy individuals (Doward 2008) . Even if these loans are reclassified, the Conservatives were much more dependent on loans from financial institutions than Labour. The Conservatives have already repaid the vast majority of the money they borrowed -seventy seven per cent.
The situation is different for Labour, which has paid back only forty-three per cent of the money borrowed. The difference between amounts borrowed and repaid is relatively small for business loans. The low rate of repayment of individual loans to Labour is the chief reason for this difference between the two parties. Of course, these statistics do not take into account the terms, interest rates or financial situations of the parties. Indeed, a handful of large loans may have been paid back precisely because it was suspected that they were disguised donations. Regression analyses (not shown) suggest that there was no relationship between loans and the electoral timetable and the standing of the parties in the polls. In other words, these loans are unlikely to be disguised pragmatic donations. Instead, they are likely to be normal commercial loans or a variety of ideological donation to the parties.
Within the sample of very large businesses, only banks have made loans to the parties.
Therefore, it seems very unlikely that the loans were attempts to disguise donations.
HSBC and Lloyds made small loans to both parties. During the sample period the Co-operative Bank made 10 loans to the Labour party, totalling over 5.5 million.
1
The Conservative party received no large loans from sample firms. Its biggest debt of 18.5 million was incurred to Irish bank, AIB in 2006.
The principal parties have also received major loans from individuals associated with very large businesses. There is only one such lender for the Conservatives: Lord Laidlaw of Rothiernay lent three and a half million, most of which was converted to a donation. The size of the loans, and their clear bias towards the government, suggest that there may have been a pragmatic motivation behind the loans. Nonetheless, these loans seem more likely to have been a personal pursuit of honours rather than a way of pursuing a business interest, while evading disclosure regulations.
[ Figure A1 about here] Note: *= significant at 5%; **=significant at 1%. Note: *= significant at 5%. Notes: The base category for the dependent variable is non-contribution. The base category for the sectoral dummies is extraction of fuels, fuel processing and production. There were two cases in which a firm contributed to both Labour and Conservatives in one month. In both cases, the larger donation was to the Conservatives, so these have been coded as Conservative contributions in the analysis above. Note: *= significant at 5%; **=significant at 1%; ***-significant at 0.1% Notes: The base category for the dependent variable is non-contribution or contribution to one of the other parties. The base category for the sectoral dummies is extraction of fuels, fuel processing and production. Sectors in which no firm contributed have been dropped. Note: *= significant at 5%; **=significant at 1%; ***-significant at 0.1%. Some sectors were dropped due to lack of variation in the dependent variable. 
Conservatives lead by 15
No difference in the polls Labour leads by 15
Mean probability of contribution to Labour Mean probability of contribution to the Conservatives Note: Derived from equations in Table 4 FIGURE 7 SIMULATIONS ACCORDING TO THE ELECTORAL TIMETABLE 0 .
0005
.001
.0015 100 days to general election 1600 days to general election Mean probability of contribution to Labour Mean probability of contribution to the Conservatives Note: Derived from equations in Table 4 FIGURE A1 
